| Fadi | Academic | The Gulf |
Re: ‘Syria's foreign policy’
I’ll attempt to provide a brief review of the nature of the relationship between each of the eight counties with Syria and present brief reflections on the route these relationships might be heading in the coming few years. To simplify this complex exercise, the countries listed could be grouped into three main categories with regards to their ongoing relationship with Syria in the last few years: Friendly, Neutral and Hostile. This categorization could help readers grasp the context of regional policies followed by Syria and by each of the countries towards it:
Friendly Countries:
a- Turkey: A Genuine Ally: Among the eight listed countries, Turkey is the newest to join the “Friendly countries” category. Despite the fact that Syria??s friendly relationship with Turkey has only been established in the last seven years, the magnitude of cooperation between the two countries has organically widened impressively in a relatively short period of time. More importantly, the relationship between the Syrian and Turkish peoples has been restored to its natural levels that prevailed historically before the Iskenderun and the Kurdish PKK issues emerged as the defining factors of Syrian-Turkish relations. The two countries have numerous mutual interests on the strategic geopolitical and economic levels. For example, Turkey considers Syria its natural gateway to the Arab market as well as its southern ??strategic depth?. Turkey also has a strategic interest in having a strong and stable Syria to avoid any possible threat from Kurdish separatists in the south. In addition, the APK??s policy towards Syria is influenced by the romantic ??Ottoman dream? of regaining historic regional influence in the Arab world. From Syria’s side, a strong economic and diplomatic ties with Turkey is vital.
b- Iran: Strategic “Marriage of convenience”: Iran??s relationship with Syria has been repeatedly described as a ??marriage of convenience?. In reality it is proved to be a long-term strategic “marriage” for both countries. This will continue and develop in the near future. Iran has been in the “friendly” category since the Islamic revolution. The two nations?? relationship has reached a level where concrete mutual benefits on the economic, political, military and strategic levels will keep this marriage intact despite all Arab regional and external attempts to force Syria into a “divorce”.
c- Russia: Matured Friendship: Russia has historically always been “Friendly” towards Syria. The quagmire of the US in Iraq have encouraged Russia to form a closer approach towards Iran and Syria. Putin’s policy of regaining a foothold in the Middle East will continue to play to the benefit of both countries. Syria will continue to depend on Russian military technology without the need to provide Russia with much in return as it will continue to gain from the closer Iran-Russia cooperation.
Any real military threat towards Syria would only strengthen Syria??s relationships with Iran, Turkey and Russia. Iran and Turkey have existential interest in a strong Syria: For Turkey these interests are mainly related to Kurdish separatists, secularism and the Iskenderun. For Iran, these interests are mainly related to Syria??s influence in Iraq and Lebanon (and their Shia??a majority). Both countries will do their best to see no “regime change” taking place in Syria and they will invest heavily in keeping Syria stable. Syria has to pursue an even closer Syrian relationship with Turkey. This might help push forward both the economic reform and -to a lesser extent- democracy in Syria. If Turkey was to finally enter the EU, Syria would gain access to the European market. If the EU continues to continue snubbing Turkey, this would serve in pushing Turkey even more closely to Syria. Almost all possible regional scenarios would lead to strengthening Syrian-Turkish relations on the economic and diplomatic levels. With regards to Iran, the least developed aspect of the Syrian-Iranian relationship is surprisingly the economic one. Expanding this aspect will only be natural given the mutual agreement on other regional policies. Overcoming the barriers to such economic cooperation will be the challenge faced by both governments. The mission of Syria’s foreign policy in the next few years is to keep all three countries in this “Friendly” group and strengthening its relationship with them.
Neutral Countries:
a – Egypt: Diminishing Leadership: Since the Iraq war in 2003, the Egyptian regional foreign policy had been characterized by “apathy”, with many similarities with the Chinese model: Focus on internal stability, economic development and reform while abandoning any effective regional role on the geopolitical front. This choice of regional policy -or lack of- allowed the Egyptian leadership to balance between external and internal pressures. With regards to Egyptian policy towards Syria, the benefits of this neutrality to the Egyptian leadership are two folds: By shifting itself from the “Friendly countries” group towards the “Neutral” one, this neutrality helps Egypt avoid external pressures by the US (through the US aid “carrot”). Also, by not following the Saudi route vis a vis Syria (through obediently implementing anti-Syria policies) and not shifting directly to the “Hostile” group, this neutrality also helped the Egyptian leadership avoid internal anti-US pro-Syria popular pressures. Since Hamas came to power, Egypt has abandoned its last regional card by the diminishing influence on Fatah and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, Syria??s role on this front has expanded with Hamas gains. Historically Egypt has not been that irrelevant on the regional arena since the decay of the Fatimid empire and the rise of the Ayyubid dynasty almost a millennium ago.
b – France: The Return of the Realist: Since president Sarkozy replaced Chirac as president, France??s attitude towards Syria and president Assad has moved into from “Hostile” to “Neutral” position. There??s still no love lost between the two presidents but the two countries are increasingly exchanging diplomatic gestures. Even the Chirac era??s ??do not meddle in Lebanon? pre-condition to talking with Syria seems not to be on the table as France has decided to engage Syria even on Lebanon presidential elections. A dramatic change from just a year earlier when Chirac allegedly encouraged Israel to attack Syria during the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006. On the economic and developmental levels, France did not stop supporting Syria??s reform and development process even during the period when France policies toward Syria were primarily driven by Chirac’s emotions on the Hariri affair.
Egypt and France will not change their neutral position towards Syria in next few years. This said however, a looming Syria-Israel war (or a wider regional US-Iran-Israel-Syria war) could potentially force Egypt to flex its regional muscles under internal public sentimental pressure and boost support to Syria on the diplomatic and maybe the military levels. Such a war might also have a counter-effect on France’s neutrality towards Syria under pressure by the US. From its part, Syria cannot do much to shift either Egypt or France to the ??Friendly? category. The relation between Syria and either country mainly depends on many regional factors beyond Syria??s control, namely: the US aid to Egypt, the Hariri investigation, the situation in Palestine, internal EU power struggles and President Mubarak??s successor.
Hostile Countries
a – Saudi: Tacit and Externally Influenced Rivalry: Historically, Saudi’s relationship with Syria had never been genuinely friendly. Saudi has historically been in the “Neutral” category towards Syria with occasional shifts to the “Friendly” category. Some successful periods of collaboration over common interests had taken place during the past 60 years, but the key deciding factor in this relationship always was the level of direct US involvement in the region. Recent history suggests that the more US involvement in the region, the less friendly the Syrian-Saudi relation will get. As a de facto rule with few exceptions, the Saudi leadership will always favor being obediently close to the US administration regardless of who is in power in both countries. The US has two key strategic goals in the Middle East: Oil and Israel. Historically, Saudi had accommodated the US on both for decades through strong patronage with regards to the oil sector (read Aramco) and strategic behind-closed-doors compromises on US-Israel regional policies. Saudi’s policies towards Syria are also driven by ideological rivalry and sectarian superiority complex. For the group of more sectarian-minded and ideological branch of policy makers around the Saudi king, Iran’s influence is what drives Saudi’s policies toward Syria. The increase of Iran’s influence in the region will only drive Saudi to follow more extreme anti-Syria policies.
b- Israel: Deeply Rooted Mutual Animosity: From Israel’s strategic perspective, the only remaining obstacle to an Israeli regional hegemony is Syria (including the ??rejectionist? movements affiliated with it). The numerous peace offensives toward Israel launched by president Assad since coming to power have repeatedly been met with aggressive and violent responses from Israel. No Syrian leader can accept the unrealistic Israeli preconditions to peace that are presented to Syria, not only from a national perspective but as a matter of political survival as well. Having all the Golan back is the only way that will allow Syria to shift its relationship with Israel to the “Neutral” group. Even then, if this was not coupled with a reasonable (or temporary) solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the new relationship will remain fragile.
c- USA: Ideological Hostility: I will not elaborate on the US relationship as it requires an article on its own, but the current neo-con influenced administration has shifted the US from the somewhat “Neutral” category (during Clinton and Bush senior eras) to the “Hostile” one on par with Israel.
The US-Saudi relationship interchangeably influence both countries’ policies towards Syria. Saudi’s relationship with Syria is primarily dependant on the US attitude towards Syria. If a more neutral attitude is to be followed by the next US administration, then Saudi’s relationship with Syria will improve, regardless of how much influence Iran will still possess in the region and regardless of any developments on the Lebanese arena. Until then, Saudi and Syria will continue to exploit the Lebanese sectarian and tribal system to pick on each other. Qatar gets an honorable mention here. Since Saudi decided to push for full take-over of Lebanon from Syria after Hariri died, Syria seems to have decided to strengthen bonds with Qatar which has been acting as a painful “thorn” on the side of Saudi’s regional policies for obscure reasons (many assume that it is as a tribal act of “revenge”). This is Syria’s limited but annoying way of saying to Saudi “You try to take-over our backyard, we’ll make friends with the rebel in your neighborhood that dares threatens your hegemony in the gulf”. Depending on how the Hariri fiasco will end, Saudi is most likely to stay in the “Hostile” group with occasional shifts to the “Neutral” one.
Conclusion
Syria’s challenge in the near future is to try to shift the countries from the “Hostile” and “Neutral” categories into the “Friendly” one. Israel and the current US administration on the other hand, will persistently try to do the opposite by forcing these countries -through using carrots, sticks or both- to follow the most extreme anti-Syria policies possible (even if it is against those countries’ own interests). The extent of their success in persuading such countries to follow anti-Syria policies would depend on complex sets of factors. For example, despite their best diplomatic, military and economic attempts, Israel and the current US administration was only able to win Saudi to the “Hostile” group from the “Neutral” one. Shifting Egypt to the “Neutral” category from the “Friendly” one was a limited success. On the other hand, Syria’s major win was shifting Turkey from the “Hostile” to “Neutral” and then quickly to the “Friendly” category in a relatively short period of time. For the objective reader trying to understand how the power struggle in the region functions, this somewhat simplified framework makes it easier to understand the dynamics that govern the complex relationships between these countries.
(13 votes, average: 4.15 out of 5)
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